On the whole, then, the military establishment of the
Crusader States could field good soldiers, but it always struggled to field
enough of them. Given the flaws of Latin armies, part of what allowed the
Crusader States to survive for as long as they did was that Muslim armies were
equally if not more flawed.
First, with the political fragmentation of the Muslim world during
most of crusading history, especially after the breakup of the Great Seljuk
Empire around 1090, any large counter-crusading army had to be a composite
force, drawn from different areas under different emirs, the regional governors
of the Islamic world. In the absence of a unified central authority, coalitions
of emirs were highly unstable. Each was jealous of his independence, unwilling
to see his rivals or the sultan profit overmuch from a campaign, and constantly
concerned about threats to his control of his district in his absence. A strong
ruler such as Saladin could overcome these divisions to some extent, but not
completely. Part of the problem was that there was no equivalent in the Muslim
world to the papal protection given to the lands and families of crusaders
during their absence. As a result, the jihad against the infidel was rarely a
top priority for regional Muslim rulers.
Second, Muslim armies were also composite forces in terms of
the support systems used to raise soldiers. So, too, it could be said, were
crusader armies. But the lines separating one sort of Latin soldier from
another were not firm: A landholding, settler knight could serve as a mercenary
in some circumstances or could join a Military Order; pilgrims and crusaders
could become settlers. In other words, all Latin soldiers were products of a
single social system, even if from different strata within that system.
Furthermore, all the Latin sources of manpower produced soldiers from the same
tactical tradition, so that melding them into a unified force on campaign was
not overly difficult. Neither condition was true of Muslim armies. The social
origins of Muslim armies were not just diverse; two of the three main sources
of manpower were essentially outside the mainstream of Muslim society, each in
a different way. And the breadth and social diversity of the Muslim world
encompassed a number of distinct tactical traditions, not to mention that
Muslim military systems evolved over time. Creating a unified fighting force
out of such material and keeping it in the field was a frequent challenge for
Muslim leaders.
To take manpower first, Muslim armies were drawn from three
main sources. At their core were the ‘askar forces, or professional soldiers
(including some slaves), of the major political leaders, the sultans and
regional emirs. As standing units of full-time, well-trained warriors, ‘askar
could conduct small-scale raids on their own. But their numbers were too
limited even at the top of the political ladder for independent campaigning
aimed at conquest. They could provide infantry or cavalry forces and were
supplemented at times by mercenaries (especially infantrymen) from among the
poorer and more troublesome elements of the cities.
For greater numbers, leaders called on the holders of iqta’
to bring themselves and a contingent of followers based on the size of the
iqta’ to the leader’s army. Iqta’ were granted to individuals in exchange for
service of many sorts (including ‘askar forces) and could consist of revenue
from a particular area, administrative control of a district, outright land
grants, or some combination thereof. The service originally was mostly
administrative, but, by the twelfth century, the Seljuks had made military
service the major form of this institution. The extent of Muslim lands meant
that considerable numbers could be raised this way, but the problem with iqta’
holders was the problem of emirs writ small. As they became attached to the
district of their grant, they became more reluctant to leave it for extended
campaigning, as personal supervision, especially at harvest time, could
increase their income and protect the land from potential rivals. Most of the
soldiers produced by this system, therefore, were part- timers who were hard to
keep in the field beyond the end of the campaigning season. Large parts of
Muslim armies regularly melted away as winter approached, a fact the Byzantines
had regularly taken advantage of in their defensive operations.
The third source of manpower for Muslim armies was tribal
auxiliaries, drawn from the warlike peoples who lived on the margins of the
Islamic world. These included many of the Arab descendants of the founders of
this world, but above all the seminomadic Turkmen who moved with their flocks
between the summer hills and winter valley pastures throughout the Muslim
world, maintaining the lifestyle of their Central Asian ancestors. While fierce
fighters, as semi-independent groups they were usually hard to discipline and
control. Plunder was their motivation for fighting: They often failed to pursue
a beaten foe if booty beckoned, at times even took to plundering the baggage of
their allies, and tended to abandon a campaign when plunder became scarce.
Thus, they were of little use in sieges and, like iqta' forces, were nearly
impossible to hold together past the end of the regular campaigning season.
Tactically, two main traditions competed. The Seljuk Turks
were classic Central Asian horse-archers who depended on maneuvers and
firepower to wear down their foes before coming to grips at close quarters.
Ambushes, envelopments, and feigned retreats were standard elements of the
Turkish tactical repertoire. There were infantry (probably in substantial
numbers) in Turkish armies, but their tactics and weaponry is virtually ignored
by the sources, so their role is difficult to assess. The armor of infantry and
cavalry were relatively light. This facilitated mobility, but more heavily
armored European soldiers created some problems for Turkish armies. Fatimid
Egypt, however, relied on spear-and bow-bearing Ethiopian infantry and on Arab
cavalry for whom the lance was the main weapon. Fatimid armies thus relied on
infantry firepower and cavalry charges much as Latin armies did, but with
lighter weapons, less armor, and smaller horses than the Latins deployed. The
superiority of the Turkish tradition is reflected not just in contemporary
crusader opinions of their two main foes (they respected the Turks but not the
Egyptians), but also in the dominance in thirteenth-century Egypt of the
Mamluks, slave soldiers in the Turkish tactical tradition (though with some
more heavily armed lancers) who revolted in 1250 and came to rule Egypt
themselves.
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