The army of Jerusalem customarily carried the True Cross into battle, and both sides saw the moment
of its capture at Hattin as decisive in Guy's defeat.
Saladin drew Guy into a long march across open territory,
which favoured his highly mobile tactics and enabled him to cut the Franks off from
crucial water sources.
COMBATANTS
Latins
c. 20,000 including 1,300 knights, at least
13,000 light cavalry and a large infantry force
Commanded by Guy of Lusignan, king of
Jerusalem
All infantry and majority of knights killed
or captured
Muslims
c.30,000 including infantry occupied at Tiberias
and not a major element
Commanded by Saladin, ruler of Syria and
Egypt
Unknown casualties
The battle Saladin's army advanced towards
Saffuriyah on 2 July, but Guy refused to accept battle. That night there was a
dramatic and angry council to decide what to do. The accounts given of this by
those we think may have known what happened are coloured by the desire of the
various Christian factions to distribute blame for the defeat that followed.
Two courses of action were suggested: that battle should be given, or that battle
should be declined and Tiberias left to its fate. It is not clear who urged
what, though many sources suggest that Raymond of Tripoli was in favour of
declining battle while his enemies, Reynald of Chatillon and Gerard of
Ridefort, Grand Master of the Temple, took the opposite view.
There was a good case for either course of
action. The kingdom was anchored by its fortified cities and castles and no
attacker could undertake a serious siege as long as a field army existed.
Accordingly, as in 1183 when Guy had been in command, the crusaders usually
preferred to shadow their enemy so that he could achieve little before the
campaigning season ended and his army dissolved, avoiding the risks of battle.
Tiberias was a minor city and its fall would achieve little. If Saladin's army
did not then disperse it could be lured into challenging the crusaders on
grounds of their choosing.
On the other hand, Guy had a huge army and
an opportunity to defeat Saladin, and revenge the destruct ion he had wrought
on the kingdom. Moreover, Guy needed the prestige of victory to unite the
kingdom. He would have remembered that many who urged avoidance of battle had
attacked him for doing just that in 1183 and he would have been fearful of criticism
for abandoning the lady of Tiberias. Therefore he decided to lead the army out
to battle on 3 July. That he intended to give battle is obvious, but we have no
idea where and how he hoped to do this.
The core of Guy's army were the knights ,
and they were drawn up in three divisions for the march, a vanguard under
Raymond of Tripoli, a rearguard commanded by Balian of Ibelin and a centre
where Guy marched. They were protected from enemy missile attack by a screen of
foot soldiers marching about them. Saladin’s army had its own heavy cavalry and
clouds of mounted archers. The crusader army paused on the springs of Tur'an
then resumed its eastward march. Saladin’s cavalry surrounded and cut them off
from Tur'an, and attacked the rearguard ferociously as they struggled uphill to
Maskana. There the army halted for the night, desperately short of water and
surrounded by their enemies.
The next morning the Muslims held back
until the heat of day sapped the crusaders. We have no dependable account of
the fighting on 4 July, but it seems that the infantry, their will sapped by
the lack of water, deserted the cavalry and took refuge on the hills known as the
'Horns of Hattin', William of Tyre tells us:
‘They
left the Springs of Saffuriya to go to the relief of Tiberias. As soon as they
had left the water behind. Saladin came before them and ordered his skirmishers
to harass them from morning to midday. The heat was so great that they could
not go on so as to reach water. The king and all his men were too spread out
and did not know what to do. He sent to the Count of Tripoli, who led the
vanguard, to ask his advice. The message came back that he should pitch his
tent and make camp. The king gladly accepted this bad advice, though when he
gave him good advice he would never take it.'
The cavalry, exposed to attack by enemy
horse-archers, tried to break the encirclement, but only Raymond of Tripoli and
Balian of Ibelin and a few others escaped. After a last desperate attempt to
establish a camp on Hattin, Guy surrendered. Saladin's superior numbers had
enabled him to hold off the increasingly desperate Christian charges. It seems inconceivable
that Guy expected to march 26 km (16 miles) to Tiberias in one day, exposing
his army to terrible thirst in an arid countryside. Whatever his plan, it
evidently went wrong.
The
significance of the battle
Saladin treated Guy with courtesy and most
of the noble survivors were ransomed, but he personally decapitated Reynald and
ordered a massacre of the Templars and Hospitallers. The remaining survivors
were enslaved. Because of the effort Guy had made to raise troops, the cities
of Palestine were virtually helpless before Saladin's army. Acre surrendered on
8 July. Sidon on 29 July. Beirut on 6 August and Ascalon on 4 September. Balian
of Ibelin held out in Jerusalem, but surrendered on terms on 2 October. This
disaster created a wave of crusading fervour in Europe which endured until the
Seventh Crusade. 1248-54. led by St Louis of France (1226-70). The kingdom
never recovered from the defeat of Hattin, after which it was always dependent
on external forces for its very survival.